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Abstract
The unpredictability of the business environment drives organizations to make rapid
business decisions with little preparation. Exploiting sudden business opportunities may
require a temporary violation of predefined information systems (IS) security policies.
Existing research on IS security policies pays little attention to how such exceptional
situations should be handled. We argue that normative theories from philosophy offer
insights on how such situations can be resolved. Accordingly, this paper advances six
design theories (the conservative-deontological, liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, virtue,
utilitarian and universalizability theories) and outlines the use of their distinctive
application principles in guiding the application of IS security policies. Based on the
testable design product hypotheses of the six design theories, we derive a theoretical
model to explain the influence of the different normative theories on the “success” of IS
security policies and guidelines.

Introduction
The functioning of modern society is increasingly reliant on computers and global
networks. In such a society, information systems security, aimed at ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, becomes a very important issue.
Not only do security violations cause loss of valuable information and damage the
organization’s reputation, but they also prevent organizations from trading. Hence, it is
1
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important to ensure that organizations’ ISs are properly secured. While a number of
technical solutions and secure system development methods exist for securing
organizations’ systems (Backhouse and Dhillon, 2001; Siponen, 2005), both
practitioners and scholars agree that an IS security policy, and its enforcement, is the
necessary foundation of organizations’ IS security (e.g., Parker, 1997; Straub, 1990;
Warman, 1992). In organizations whose future circumstances are difficult to predict in
advance (Boyd and Fulk, 1996 p. 4; Daft, et al., 1988 p. 125), unexpected business
opportunities may require actions that conflict with their IS security policy. In such
situations, word-for-word compliance with a rigid IS policy may prevent organizations
from taking advantage of such unanticipated business opportunities. We refer to these
as exceptional situations.2
While such exceptional situations are recognized in IS security literature (Baskerville,
1995 p. 245; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000 p. 126), extant research does not address
how these exceptional situations should be handled.
In trying to understand under what conditions normative IS security policies and
guidelines may be violated, we find normative theories in philosophy extremely useful.
Accordingly, this paper presents six design theories in the sense of Walls, Wildmeyer
and El Sawy (1992) for the application of IS security guidelines in exceptional situations,
influenced by normative theories in philosophy. Based on the testable design product
hypotheses of the six design theories, we derive a theoretical model to explain the
influence of the different normative theories on the “success” of IS security policies and
guidelines.
Research into IS security policies and guidelines in exceptional situations has value for
scholars and practitioners. For scholars, the paper advances a foundation for future
research on how to balance IS security and business opportunities in exceptional
situations. For practitioners, the paper offers insights on how they may apply wisdom
from applied philosophy in solving exceptional situations in practice.
This paper is organized in six sections as follows. In the Section “Design Theories and
Existing Work on Security Policies”,, an IS security policy design theory framework is
first elaborated, including the three criteria for IS security polices and guidelines. Then,
existing studies on IS security policies are scrutinized in order to point out the extent to
which the extant studies on IS security policies meet these three criteria. At the end of
the Section, it is pointed out that extant works on IS security policies do not address the
third criterion (how to apply IS security guidelines and policies in exceptional situations).
The Section “Philosophical Normative Theories and IS Security Policies and Guidelines”
outlines normative theories for IS policies and guidelines, introducing six normative
theories as kernel theories for IS security policies and guidelines, and Section “The Six
Normative Theories and Design Theories for IS Security Policies and Guidelines”
discusses these in more detail. Then an agenda for future research on the application of
IS security policies and guidelines is proposed in the “Discussion” section. In the final
section, the key findings of the paper are summarized.
2

Note that conceptually these ‘exceptional situations’ differ from ‘exceptions’ as “cases that
cannot be correctly be processed by computer systems alone” (Strong and Miller, 1995, pp. 206).
While the exceptional situations may be addressed following the organization’s IS security
policies and guidelines, this may not be reasonable from the viewpoint of their business
objectives.
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Design Theories and Existing Work on Security Policies
IS Design Theorizing and Security Policies
Walls, Wildmeyer and El Sawy (1992) propose that design theories should be based on
kernel theories and should inform the researcher by providing testable research
hypotheses. They see IS design theories as having two dimensions: a product (e.g., a
software product or security policy) and a design process (the phases to be followed in
constructing the product) – see Figure 1. In addition, design theories are normative and
prescriptive, as opposed to theories in natural science, which are descriptive,
explanatory, and predictive (Markus, et al., 2002; Walls, et al., 1992 p. 37).
Hevner, March, Park and Ram (2004 p. 77-78) recognize that designing policies is a
potential application of design theory. In this paper, we view IS security policies and
guidelines as design products. Typically, IS security policies and guidelines are
normative lists of actions that the employees should (or should not) perform (Warman,
1992 p. 309). However, the design of IS security policies and guidelines faces the
problem that such policies and guidelines do not necessarily make it possible to address
all situations reasonably. To illustrate this, Puhakainen (2006) describes a company in
which IS security guidelines strictly forbid taking any information away from the company

Figure 1. An IS security policy design theory (modified from Walls, et al., 1992)
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premises without formal permission from the IS security manager. However, the
employees of the company needed to take their laptops, USB sticks, and CDs to their
homes and to meetings outside of the company. As a result, employees violated the IS
security policy, since in some cases they felt they would lose their customers and
collaborators if they waited for the formal approval process.
The product is the IS security policy or guideline, also including an application principle
stating how the IS security policies and guidelines are to be applied. The design method
states how the product (IS security guideline) is to be crafted. Application principles may
also guide the design of IS security policies and guidelines.
As this case illustrates, it is important to know whether the policies and guidelines can be
violated by employees in a situation where word-for-word compliance with them would
jeopardize a business opportunity. And if they can, under what conditions and in what
circumstances is this permissible? We claim that IS security policies and guidelines
should be equipped with ‘application principles’ to solve such exceptional situations
(Figure 1). Recognizing this, a design theory for IS security policies should meet three
criteria – it should: (1) be based on kernel theories; (2) offer normative guidance for
practitioners on how to design and apply such policies and guidelines;3 and (3) propose
a research agenda (testable hypotheses) for scholars (Walls, et al., 1992).

Extant Security Policies in the Light of IS Security Policy Design Theory
This section examines the extent to which existing approaches to IS security policy
address these three IS security design theory criteria (Table 1).
Criterion 1: Kernel theories
The underlying kernel theory provides the necessary foundation on which guidance for
practitioners and a research agenda can be developed (Markus, et al., 2002). Of the
extant studies, only Karyda, Kokolakis and Kiountouzis (2003) is explicitly derived from a
reference discipline (first criterion). The lack of theoretical underpinnings may explain
why studies on IS policies fail to offer concrete guidance to practitioners as to how to
design IS security policies and how possible exceptional situations can be handled
(criterion 2).
Criterion 2: Application principles
The application principles should provide advice on how to handle exceptional situations
(second criterion), since adherence to a security policy in certain circumstances may
prevent the achievement of business objectives (for example, a business opportunity
suddenly emerges, but cannot be taken advantage of, as it would violate IS security
policy and guidelines).
Existing IS security policies do not provide advice on how to handle exceptional
situations (criterion 4). Even though Corby (1999), Hale (1996), Palmer, Robinson,
Patilla, and Moser (2001 p. 22), and Wood (1997c p. 16) recognize the need to make
exceptions, of all the existing IS security policy studies, only Dhillon and Backhouse (2000)
3

Application principles are not covered by the original design theory framework of Walls,
Wildmeyer and El Sawy (1992).
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Table 1. Existing IS Security Policy Approaches and the Three IS Security Design
Theory Criteria 4
Approach
Criterion 1:
Criterion 2:
Criterion 3:
Kernel theories
Application
Testable
principles
hypotheses
Baskerville and Siponen (2002)
?
?
Broderick (2001)
BS7799
Corby (1999)
?
Dhillon (1997)
?
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000)
David (2002)
Friedl (1990)
Fulford and Doherty (2003)
+
Hale (1996)
Hickson (1997)
Höne and Eloff (2002)
ISF Standard (2003)
Karyda et al. (2002)
+
?
Lindup (1995)
Nosworthy (2000)
Olnes (1994)
Osborne (1998)
+
Palmer et al. (2001)
Pounder (1997)
Pounder (2001)
Pounder (2002)
SSE-CMM (1998)
Walter (1993)
Warman (1992)
?
Wood (1995)
Wood (1996a)
Wood (1996b)
Wood (1996c)
Wood (1997a)
Wood (1997b)
Wood (1997c)
Wylder (2003)
?
can be regarded as providing guidance on how to handle exceptional situations (criterion
2: application principles). Dhillon and Backhouse (2000 p. 127-128) propose four
principles: responsibility, integrity, trust, and ethicality. Although their work makes a
novel contribution, it is not quite clear how their principles can be applied in practice
(how does one know what an “ethical” action is, for example?), or how to proceed if
these principles are in conflict with the business objectives of the company.
4

The symbol + means that the approach meets the criterion, and – refers to a lack of such a
feature. The symbol ? means that, even though the approach does not explicitly address a certain
criterion, there are implicit hints as to the existence of such a feature.
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Criterion 3: Testable hypotheses
‘Testable hypotheses’ refers to systematic research agendas that guide future research
on IS security policies. While the approaches of Corby (1999), David (2002), Fulford and
Doherty (2003), Karyda, Kokolakis and Kiountouzis. (2003), Osborne (1998), Baskerville
and Siponen (2002), Warman (1992), and Wylder (2003) may be interpreted as having
testable hypotheses or a research agenda (criterion 3), none of these studies present
testable hypotheses with regard to application principles (criterion 2).
Summarizing the analysis of 33 IS security policy studies, a few approaches address
one or two of the IS security design theory criteria: kernel theories (criterion 1) and
testable hypotheses (criterion 3), but none of them address guidelines to cover
exceptional cases (criterion 2). Therefore, there is a need to seek alternative normative
theories to guide application of IS security policies and guidelines.

Philosophical Normative Theories and IS Security Policies and
Guidelines
Introduction
In seeking candidate kernel theories, we found the normative theories to constitute ideal
reference theories for the application principles, for two reasons. First, IS designoriented theories are normative and prescriptive, in contrast to natural science theories,
which are explanatory or predictive (Walls, et al., 1992). IS security policies are also
seen as mandatory by nature (Wood, 1995): they lay down the IS security actions (the
list of “dos and don’ts”) that employees should follow in general. Second, an IS security
policy design theory should contain normative application principles on how to apply the
list of ‘dos and don’ts’ (the security policies and guidelines) in exceptional situations.
Recognizing this normative dimension, there is no doubt about what constitutes the ideal
theoretical foundation (or kernel theory base) for the application principles: normative
theories in philosophy. While empirical social sciences investigate what people do,
normative theories ponder what people should do (Hare, 1997).5 Indeed, in the domain
of normative theories, from Aristotle through Kant, and up to present-day thinkers,
scholars have sought answers to such questions as how to a settle a conflict between
two different norms, or how to act in cases where conforming to the established norm
yields negative results. These problems are similar to those studied in this paper. Finally,
the history of normative theories is more than 2,500 years old; thus, normative theories
are mature in comparison to any other discipline. This being the case, normative
theories are ideal candidates for kernel theories in the context of the present study.
Alternative normative theories include the theory of information ethics (Floridi, 1999),
Habermas’ (1990) discourse ethics, universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1952, 1963, 1981,
1999), Kantian ethics (Kant, 1993), utilitarianism (e.g., Bentham, 1876; Mill, 1895),
intuitionism (Ross, 1930), Mackie’s (1981) approach, the theory of justice (Rawls, 1972),
emotivism (Stevenson, 1944), and virtue ethics (e.g., Hursthouse, 1996; MacIntyre,
1987).
5

Hume (1711-1776) warns us, in his thesis of “no ought from an is”, about the logical problem of
basing a normative action on empirical knowledge alone.
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Six Normative Theories for IS Security Policies and Guidelines
Of these alternative normative theories, we have selected six main categories of theories
to form the basis for alternative application principles. These are the conservative
deontological, the liberal-intuitive, the prima-facie, the virtue ethics, the utilitarian, and
the universalizability theories. We do not claim that these six theories form the only way
of categorizing normative theories. They do, however, cover a large body of extant
normative theories, and they have obvious applicability for IS security policies and
guidelines, as will be illustrated below (Table 2).
Table 2. Alternative Normative Theories on Which to Base Application Principles
Normative theories
Recognize exceptional Method for handling
situations
the exceptional
situations
The conservative deontological
No
No method is provided
Yes, but does not take any
The liberal-intuitive
No method is provided
normative stance
Prima-facie
Yes
Benefit
The virtue ethics
Yes
Virtues
The utilitarian
Yes
Overall happiness
The universalizability theories
Yes
Universality thesis
Deontological theories hold that objective moral rules exist. The conservative
deontological theory stems from deontological moral norms, such as Kant’s doctrine of
treating humans as an end rather than as a means (Kant, 1993). Another form of
conservative deontological theory is present in Judeo-Christian teachings, where the
Ten Commandments are interpreted literally. So, according to conservative
deontological theory, rules in normative systems are absolute, predefined and intended
to be followed literally. When applied to IS security policies and guidelines, rules in
conservative deontological IS security policies and guidelines must be followed to the
letter without thinking about possible consequences. 6 And, if some situation is not
explicitly addressed in the conservative deontological IS security guideline, e.g., taking
information off company premises (cf., example in section 2.1), then the action is not
allowed by default.
The opposite view to the conservative deontological theory is the liberal-intuitive theory,
stemming from libertarianism. It holds that if something is not forbidden, it is allowed. In
the case of IS security policies and guidelines, this means that if certain IS security
situations are not covered by the IS security polices and guidelines, then employees are
allowed to do whatever they want to in those situations 7 , 8 . While the conservative
deontological theory does not recognize exceptional situations at all (since if something
is not addressed in the IS security policy, it is forbidden), the liberal-intuitive theory does
not give any methodological advice on how to act in exceptional situations. To counter
6

Lupu and Sloman (1999 p. 854) call this policy the “negative authorization policy”.
It stresses minimal external regulation and the maximization of the autonomy of the individual
over authority: “Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty” (Kukathas and Pettit, 1990 p.
50).
8
Lupu and Sloman (1999 p. 863) refer to a similar policy as the “open policy”; otherwise we find
no examples on the liberal-intuitive theory in IS security literature.
7
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this problem, a number of alternative theories (the prima-facie, the virtue ethics, the
utilitarian, and the universalizability theories) have been advanced.
The prima-facie theory from Ross (1930) recognizes exceptional situations. Applied to IS
security, it takes the view that security guidelines should be followed in general. In
exceptional situations, however, one may violate them if the business benefits of
compromising the guidelines outweigh the benefits of complying with them.
While the prima-facie theory focuses on calculating benefits, virtue ethics, forming the
virtue design theory (Hursthouse, 1996; MacIntyre, 1987), suggest that we should
instead develop virtues personally. Virtues are praiseworthy qualities or characteristics
that people may possess.9 MacIntyre extracts unitary core concepts for the virtue design
theory from different theories of virtue ethics: the virtues of justice, courage, and honesty
(MacIntyre, 1987 p. 123 and 128). 10 Virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 1987) and Christian
theology 11 also adhere to the thesis of supererogation. In philosophy, supererogation
refers to positive actions that go beyond what is required. Supererogatory actions are
praiseworthy, yet at the same time voluntary. For example, an elderly or disabled person
putting his or her life at very high risk in an attempt to save others from a fire may be
considered a supererogatory action. The person acted virtuously, but had the person not
taken the action, he could not be regarded as blameworthy. Applied to IS security
policies and guidelines, the idea of supererogation means that the IS security policy and
guidelines prescribe an ideal or a virtuous code of conduct for the organization’s
employees to follow. Thus, actions in conflict with the IS security policies and guidelines
are not deemed to be wrong or punishable.
While the prima-facie theory stresses the business benefits and the virtue theory
stresses cultivation of proper virtues in exceptional situations, the utilitarian theory
(Bentham, 1876; Mill, 1895) suggests that the key issue is the maximization of utility.
According to Bentham, the key idea in maximizing utility is the concept of felicity
(happiness). For Bentham, felicity is a combination of pleasure and the absence of
pain.12 Thus, in a nutshell, utilitarianism holds that an act that produces the greatest
felicity for the greatest number of people, measured in terms of pleasure and absence of
pain, is the right action.
The universalizability theory, in turn, suggests that rather than relying on relativistic
virtues and calculating benefits (prima-facie) or overall happiness (utilitarianism), an
acceptable action should be one that the person would also accept if he were on the
receiving end of the action. According to another interpretation, we should only accept
those actions that we could accept no matter what position we held in society or the

9

MacIntyre divides the theories of virtue ethics into three categories: (1) virtues enable
individuals to perform well in their social roles (e.g., a judge in court is a social role and it can be
seen that judge is expected to be impartial and just; hence the virtues of a judge may include
impartiality and justness); (2) virtues enable us to move towards the achievement of a certain
ultimate natural or supernatural purpose (human telos) (as suggested by Aristotle, the New
Testament, and Aquinas); (3) virtues contribute to the achievement of heavenly and earthly
success (as suggested by Franklin) (MacIntyre, 1987 p. 122).
10
MacIntyre does, however, leave the door open for other possible virtues.
11
In theology, supererogation refers to good acts done in “a state of grace”.
12
Other forms of utilitarianism include negative utilitarianism, which is aimed at maximizing the
absence of pain.
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organization. 13 Variations of the universality theses form the foundations of Kantian
ethics, universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1981), the theory of justice (Rawls, 1971), and
Judeo-Christian ethics.

A Case to Illustrate the Six Normative Theories
In this real case, a project team in a software house maintains close collaboration with
customers when developing software. This software house has strict security rules laid
down by a senior security specialist, who is regarded as the authority figure. The security
policy includes a rule that states that passwords are personal and that one’s password
cannot be given to anybody else. Any exception must be approved by the senior security
specialist. During the summer, while the senior security specialist and most of the
developers are on their holidays, a few members of the project team receive additional
requirements and feature changes from an important customer. The members of the
team need to make changes to the software quickly to keep to their deadline. To do this
they need to access some files to which they currently do not have access (access can
be granted by a developer and the security specialist or his subordinates). The senior
security specialist cannot be reached at that time, and the developer who has control
over the files is also on holiday. He is available, but cannot remember his password (he
forgot it while on holiday). Subordinates of the senior security specialist can be
contacted, but they do not dare to violate the IS security policy of the organization. As a
result, the members of the project team are forced to wait for the senior security
specialist to return in order to access the files. This will result in the software company
missing the deadline.
According to the conservative-deontological theory, the IS security policy cannot be
violated, and therefore, in the above case, the subordinates of the senior security
specialist should not violate the security policy of the organization under any
circumstances. The subordinates must obey the security rules in all circumstances, and
according to these rules the security specialist’s approval must be awaited. In this case,
the liberal-intuitive theory desires the same response, since according to the security
rules of the organization, every exception must be approved by the senior security
specialist.
According to the prima-facie theory, IS security policy can be violated provided that (i)
business objectives and security requirements are in conflict, and (ii) the benefits of
compromising those guidelines outweigh the benefits of complying with them. In this
situation, the subordinates realize that the first condition is met. On the one hand,
security rules dictate that the subordinates cannot grant access for the other members of
the team. On the other, if access is not granted, negative ramifications for business may
result, including losing an important client. Thus, in light of the prima-facie theory, given
that the violation of the IS security policy would maximize business benefits, the IS
security policy can be violated.

13

According to Rawls (1971), the universalizability thesis makes us ask what principles of justice
we would choose to govern a society or an organization in which, as members of it, we could be
anyone in any position (Rawls, 1971). Or, according to another interpretation of thesis: “…we
accept only those moral prescriptions which we are prepared to prescribe for all similar cases, no
matter what position we ourselves occupy in them.” (Hare, 1996 p. 177).
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The virtue theory regards IS security policy compliance as voluntary, Thus, while
adherence to the IS security policy is regarded as positive (as a ‘virtue’), the
subordinates of the senior security specialist can exercise their own judgment if they
wish. Moreover, according to virtue ethics, in exceptional situations the employees’ own
judgment is acceptable if the actions are regarded as just, honest, and courageous.
Which actions are just, honest, and courageous depends on the organizational culture in
question. The subordinates may believe that in this scenario, for instance, just and
honest imply that the action should be carried out in the firm’s and their customer’s best
interests, without violating anyone’s rights. Recognizing that the subordinates can use
their own judgment, and provided that violating the security rules in this case can be
seen as just and honest as discussed above, the subordinates may violate the security
rules and grant access to these project team members.
If the software house had a utilitarian theory in place, they would need to follow the IS
security guidelines in normal circumstances. In exceptional situations, or situations
suspected to be exceptional, a resolution is arrived at by means of utilitarian happiness
calculus. The subordinates of the security manager realize that this is not a normal
situation. In order to implement the suddenly-emerged requirement from the important
customer during the holiday season, the team members need to access certain files. To
decide whether they can bypass the security rules, the subordinates should, according
to the utilitarian theory, calculate the happiness of the greatest number of people, taking
into account the absence of pain, and should favor the option that maximizes the overall
happiness. Here “people” would refer to those persons affected by the decision on
whether or not to violate the security rules. On the one hand, the security specialist’s
subordinates may consider that a violation of the security policy will probably anger the
security specialist. Thus, in utilitarian terms, non-compliance with the security rules
causes unhappiness to the security manager. On the other hand, given the urgent
business need to meet the requirements of the important customer, the violation of the
IS security policy would in this case maximize the overall happiness in the company
because complying with the IS security policy and guidelines results in the developers
not being able to keep to the deadline. This is assumed to have two types of negative
implications. First, they may lose the important customer, which may have direct
monetary consequences. Second, it is assumed that maintaining tight security rules for
their own sake in this case may cause dissatisfaction (unhappiness) among the team
members, as they would feel that they were not able to do their work. Recognizing these
factors, while disobedience to the security rules may increase the security manager’s
unhappiness, the important customer’s and team members’ feelings of unhappiness that
would result from non-compliance are much greater. Hence, if the subordinates are
following utilitarian IS security policy theory, they should compromise the security rules
in this situation.
In the case of the universalizability theory, the IS security policy can be violated in
exceptional situations, provided that the action in question satisfies one of the two
universalizability rules. Let us assume that the company has adopted the second rule of
the universalizability theory: if you were the president of the organization, would you
allow action Y by any trustworthy X? Here, Y refers to violation of the IS security policy in
order to speed up software development, and X refers to the members of the project
group who need access to the files. In this case, the senior security specialist’s
subordinates ponder whether they would allow the action if they were in the company
president’s shoes. Recognizing the business need to violate the security policy, the
security specialist’s subordinates see no reason why the president of the company
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would not allow a violation of the security rule in this case. Adherence to the IS security
policy would mean that the software would not be developed as agreed with the client,
which would result in financial loss for this project (and perhaps also in the future,
through loss of contracts), a bad reputation, and so on. Thus, in the light of the
universalizability theory, the subordinates can violate the IS security policy.

The Six Normative Theories and Design Theories for IS Security
Policies and Guidelines
Next we will describe the six normative theories as potential bases for design theories
for IS security policies and guidelines. While it is impossible to list all exceptional
situations in different companies,14 the application principles can be used to scrutinize
whether IS security policies and guidelines can be violated in any given situation. The
reader may then wonder why we need IS security policies or other norms. Instead, why
not just use application principles in all situations? There is a practical reason for this.
We may not have time to ponder all the situations we face every day by using the
application principles. For all these “ordinary situations” we encounter, the established
norms, like IS security policies and guidelines, are useful (cf., Hare, 1981; Twining and
Myers, 1999 p. 15).
Furthermore, normative theories in socio-politics and ethics typically ponder what is
morally right for individuals. In this paper, we have made a point of departure by focusing
on what is in the company’s interest. Our application of the normative theories is
business-oriented: how can they be applied in the design of IS security policies and
guidelines and application principles so that the IS security policies, guidelines, and
application principles as a whole will serve the company in the best way? For this
purpose, we will introduce the concept of Total Cost of Security Actions (TCSA). TCSA
functions as the dependent variable to be minimized. TCSA is a measure of all costs
resulting from developing IS security polices and guidelines, from violating them, and
from complying with them. Thus, TCSA covers all costs that can be attributed to an IS
security violation, including immediate recovery costs and potential losses, such as lost
business opportunities or loss of reputation for the business. TCSA also includes the
costs of potential loss of business opportunities resulting from adherence to the IS
security policies and guidelines. For example, in the case presented in section 3.3, strict
adherence to the IS security policies and guidelines results in the developers being
unable to deliver the software to the client in time. This may damage their reputation in
the eyes of the important client and lead to sanctions for not keeping the deadline.
These, in turn, increase the risk that the important client will order its future software
from competitors. Since such costs are different in different organizations and situations,
it is impossible to provide a more explicit list of cost factors.
Our analysis follows the structure of the design product side of Figure 1, distinguishing
kernel theories, meta-requirements, application principles, and testable design product
14

An attempt to list all exceptional situations would lead to circular arguments, since if we tried to
list all possible ordinary or exceptional situations, there would be “exceptional” situations in which
this list would not apply. And then we would need additional application principles to solve these
situations, and so on. Furthermore, when organizations face the same exceptional situations
often enough the “exceptional situations” may become “ordinary,” and they may be subsequently
captured by IS security policies and guidelines (cf., Hare, 1981).
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hypotheses. Since we do not suggest any IS security policies and guidelines, we omit
meta-design from our analysis.

The Conservative Deontological Design Theory
The kernel theories of a conservative deontological design theory for IS security policies
and guidelines are deontological moral theories. The design theory claims that what is
not allowed by the IS security policies and guidelines is strictly rejected regardless of the
consequences to which it would lead (see Table 3, point 3: Application principles). Thus,
the meta-requirement is that IS security policies should list actions that employees must
perform (Table 3: Meta-requirements). Employees should simply follow the list of dos
and don’ts in the IS security policies and guidelines “religiously.” The conservative
deontological design theory is explicitly favored by David (2002 p. 510), for example.
Table 3. The Conservative Deontological Design Theory for IS Security Policies
and Guidelines
1. Kernel theories
Deontological moral theories.
2. Meta-requirements
IS security policies and guidelines must be comprehensive.
IS security policies and guidelines must list all actions that
employees must perform.
3. Application principles Only the conventional level: follow the list of do’s and don’ts
literally.
4. Testable design
H1. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and
product hypotheses
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA.
H2. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA.
The conservative deontological design theory implicitly assumes that the set of IS
security policies should be as comprehensive as possible to define all allowable IS
security actions. At the same time, it assumes that its application should be mandatory
(non-voluntary). Yet no policy or guideline is absolutely mandatory, so employees could
violate them if they decide to do so. In fact, each employee interprets a given IS security
policy or guideline as mandatory to varying degrees (cf., Davidson, 1970). This links the
hypotheses with the concept of “voluntariness” (Moore and Benbasat, 1991), and with
the extant research on the impact of voluntariness on the acceptance of different IT
artifacts (e.g., Iivari, 1996; Agarwal and Prasad, 1997; Karahanna, et al., 1999;
Venkatesh, et al., 2003). Thus, the two testable design product hypotheses are: H1: the
more comprehensive the IS security polices and guidelines are, the lower the total cost
of Security Activities (TCSA); and H2: the more mandatory (i.e., less voluntary) the
security policies and guidelines are, the more strictly enforced they will be, and the lower
the TCSA will be.

The Liberal-Intuitive Design Theory
The kernel theory of a liberal-intuitive design theory for IS security policies and
guidelines is libertarianism. According to liberal-intuitive design theory, those IS security
actions that are not prohibited are allowed (Table 4). The first meta-requirement of this
design theory differs from the conservative deontological design theory in that the liberalintuitive design theory lists not all, but only the necessary actions that employees must
perform. Liberal-intuitive IS security policies and guidelines are intended to be followed
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literally; however, the meta-requirement is that if something is not covered by the IS
security policy and guidelines, employees can take appropriate action to remedy the
situation. The application decision is based on an employee’s intuition.
Table 4. The Liberal-Intuitive Design Theory for IS Security Policies and
Guidelines
1. Kernel theories
Libertarianism, autonomy.
2. Meta-requirements
1: IS security policies must list the necessary or key actions
that employees must perform.
2: If something is not covered by IS security policy and
guidelines, employees can take appropriate action to remedy
the situation.
3. Application principles 1. IS security guidelines are intended to be followed literally.
2. What is not explicitly denied is allowed.
3. If something is not covered by IS security policy and
guidelines, follow your intuition.
4. Testable design
H3: The smaller the set of necessary IS security policies and
product hypotheses
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA.
H4: The more mandatory (less voluntary) it is for employees
to follow the necessary IS security policies and guidelines,
the lower the TCSA.
The first meta-requirement that it is relevant to list only the very necessary IS security
actions (Table 4) is very similar to the socio-technical design principle of minimal critical
specification (Herbst, 1974). The principle of minimal critical specification in sociotechnical thinking means that one identifies only the minimal set of conditions required to
create viable, self-maintaining, and self-adjusting production units. As a consequence,
the liberal-intuitive design theory includes the hypothesis (H3) that the smaller the set of
critical (necessary) IS security policies and guidelines is, the lower the TCSA will be.
This is essentially based on the assumption that employees’ autonomy should be
maximized, especially in situations not covered by the IS security policies and guidelines.
However, the liberal-intuitive design theory presupposes strict compliance with the
necessary IS security policies and guidelines. As a consequence, the second hypothesis
claims that the more mandatory it is for employees to follow the critical IS security
policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA will be.
In exceptional situations, the liberal-intuitive design trusts employees’ autonomy,
suggesting that employees’ self-determination and intrinsic motivation lead to better
acceptance of IS security guidelines and policies, compared to extrinsic motivation to
comply with IS security guidelines. Thus, the advocates of the liberal-intuitive design
theory recognize that stressing employees’ self-determination (employees’ freedom to
make their own decisions) may have weaknesses in terms of TCSA. These weaknesses
relate to the permissive nature of the design theory: the fact that employees can
exercise their own judgment may lead to potential risks from security and business
perspectives. Despite such risks, advocates of the liberal-intuitive design theory consider
that using minimal external impositions leads to better overall results in terms of TCSA.
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The Prima-Facie Design Theory
The kernel theory of the prima-facie design theory for IS security policies and guidelines
is based on Ross’ (1930) prima-facie principles, taking the view that IS security policy
and guidelines should be followed in normal situations. However, when solving conflicts
in exceptional situations, the prima-facie design theory holds that IS security policies and
guidelines can be formally violated, as long as the expected benefits of compromising
those security guidelines (excluding a person’s egoistic/ideological benefits) clearly
outweigh the expected benefits of complying with the security guidelines, in terms of the
TCSA (Table 5).
Table 5. The Prima-Facie Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines.
1. Kernel theory
The prima-facie principles of Ross.
2. Meta-requirements
IS security policies must list all actions that employees must
perform in normal situations.
3. Application principles The conventional level and critical levels. Guidelines can be
violated in exceptional situations if the expected benefits of
compromising the guidelines outweigh the expected benefits
of complying with the security guidelines in terms of TCSA.
4. Testable design
H5. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and
product hypotheses
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in normal
situations.
H6. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA in
normal situations.
H7. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines and the more the expected
benefits of compromising those guidelines outweigh the
expected benefits of complying with the security guidelines,
the lower the TCSA in exceptional situations.
The prima-facie design theory includes Hypothesis H5, which states that the more
comprehensive the IS security policies and guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in
normal situations, and Hypothesis H6, which states that the more mandatory (less
voluntary) compliance with IS security policies and guidelines is in normal situations, the
lower TCSA will be. Hypothesis H7 assumes an interaction effect between voluntariness
and expected benefits (expected benefits of compromising – expected benefits of
complying): the more voluntary and the higher the net benefit, the lower TCSA will be.

The Virtue Design Theory
The kernel theories of the virtue design theory for IS security policies and guidelines are
virtue ethics by MacIntyre (1987)—including the virtues of justice, courage, and
honesty—and the thesis of supererogation. Thus, the meta-requirement of the virtue
design theory states that IS security policies and guidelines are supererogatory, and
describe the actions that virtuous employees follow.15 However, actions in conflict with
IS security policies and guidelines are not considered to be wrong, or punishable. The
15

Here the IS security policy and guidelines are loosely interpreted as ‘the standard’, following
MacIntyre’s (1987) term.
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application decision in resolving possible conflicts between security policies and
business goals is made in light of the virtues (justice, honesty, and courage) – see Table
6.
Table 6. The Virtue Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines.
1. Kernel theories
Virtue ethics and the thesis of supererogation in virtue ethics.
2. Meta-requirements
IS security policies and guidelines should list virtuous
conduct.
3. Application principles 1. Obedience to IS security guidelines is not obligatory,
though it is virtuous.
2. Virtuous actions, as defined by the IS security policy and
guidelines, are welcomed, but not compulsory, in exceptional
situations.
4. Testable design
H8. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
product hypothesis
security policies and guidelines, and the more virtuous (just,
courageous and honest) the actions are, the lower the TCSA
in exceptional situations.
The testable design product hypothesis, H8, referring to the virtuousness of actions,
differs from the prima-facie design theory, which refers to the relative benefits of
compromising and complying with IS security policies and guidelines.

The Utilitarian Design Theory
Utilitarianism is the kernel theory of the utilitarian design theory for IS security policies
and guidelines. The utilitarian design theory suggests that, in general, IS security
policies and guidelines should be followed (Table 7).
Table 7. The Utilitarian Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines.
1. Kernel theory
Utilitarianism.
2. Meta-requirements
IS security policies must list all the actions that employees
must perform in normal circumstances.
3. Application principles 1. Follow guidelines in normal circumstances.
2. Otherwise, the happiness of the greatest number of people
and the absence of pain are the factors that count in deciding
whether an action is allowable.
4. Testable design
H5. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and
product hypotheses
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in normal
situations.
H6. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA in
normal situations.
H9. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines, and the more happiness
brought about by the actions of employees, the lower the
TCSA in exceptional situations.
According to the utilitarian design theory, IS security policies and guidelines can be
violated in special circumstances: they are to be compromised only if an act in violation
of the security policy produces the greatest happiness, or good, for all the people
affected by that action. Thus, the utilitarian design theory is similar to the prima-facie and
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universalizability IS security policy design theories, in that they all recognize the need to
allow for violation of IS security policies and guidelines, provided that this yields a more
positive effect than would be produced by following the policies and guidelines. The
utilitarian design theory views the happiness of the greatest number of people as the
factor that counts in deciding whether an action is allowable (Table 7: Application
principles). That is, the best action to minimize TCSA is that which maximizes overall
happiness.
The first two testable design product hypotheses, H5 and H6, are identical to those of
the prima-facie theory. Hypothesis H9 refers, however, to overall happiness rather than
to benefits, as in the case of the prima-facie theory.

The Universalizability Design Theory
The kernel theory of the universalizability design theory for IS security policies and
guidelines is the thesis of universalizability. This view holds that the requirements of IS
security policies and guidelines should, in general, be met. However, if considered
inadequate (e.g., the rules are conflicting or, in an exceptional situation, the actions
specified in the IS security guidelines do not seem to produce the best results in terms of
TCSA), the IS security policies and guidelines can be violated, provided that the violation
satisfies the thesis of universalizability.
Table 8. Universalizability Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines
1. Kernel theories
Universalizability theories.
2. Meta-requirements
IS security policies must list all actions that employees must
perform in normal circumstances.
3. Application principles In normal circumstances, follow the standard IS security
guideline. Otherwise, apply either of the two alternative
universalizability principles:
1: Action Y is allowed if it is allowed for any X in the same or
a similar situation;
2: If you were the security manager or the president of the
organization, would you allow action Y by any trustworthy X?
4. Testable design
H5. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and
product hypotheses
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in normal
situations.
H6. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA in
normal situations.
H10. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS
security policies and guidelines, and the more universalizable
the actions (of employees) are, the lower the TCSA in
exceptional situations.
The universalizability design theory has meta-requirements similar to the prima-facie and
utilitarian design theories. However, the method used to solve possible conflicts or test
the relevance of IS policies differs from those of the other design theories.
The universalizability thesis consists of two sub-theses: “security partial” and “impartial,”
which are the two application principles for solving possible conflicts or testing the
relevance of an IS policy. The impartial universalizability thesis states:
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Action Y is allowed if it is allowed for any X in the same or similar situation.
The security/business objective partial universality thesis states:
If you were the security manager or the president of the organization, would you
allow action Y by any trustworthy X?
X refers to any worker and Y to actions. Thus, in the case of the second (security partial
universality) thesis, an employee considers whether, if he or she were the security
manager or president, he or she would allow the action.
The first testable design product Hypotheses H5 and H6 are identical to the prima-facie
and utilitarian design theories. In terms of Hypothesis H10, the universalizability thesis in
a sense requires absolute universalizability. However, in practice, the action may be
more or less universally accepted by the members of society. Therefore, Hypothesis
H10 recognizes different degrees of universalizability, but, it can also be interpreted as a
dichotomous variable (non-universalizable, universalizable), if so desired. Otherwise,
Hypothesis H10 is analogous to the corresponding hypothesis of the prima-facie, virtues,
and utilitarian design theories, the difference being that it refers to universalizability
instead of benefits, virtuousness, or overall happiness.

Summary
The above analysis leads to the following classification of IS security policies and
guidelines (Figure 2). The classification is based on the hypotheses generated in Tables
3-8. Conservative-deontological theory, on the one hand, and liberal intuitive and primafacie design theories, on the other hand, represent opposite extremes.

Figure 2. Classification of Design Theories for IS Security Policies and
Guidelines
The other three design theories represent intermediate positions between the two
extremes. They share Hypotheses H5 and H6, but each of them proposes different
reasons and rationales for the violation of IS security policies and guidelines in
exceptional situations.
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Discussion
Implications for Practice
This paper proposes six design theories based on normative theories developed in
philosophy to make sense of alternative views of application principles. These
application principles are important for practitioners not only in the development of IS
security policies and guidelines, but also in the application of these policies in different
situations. The alternative positions affect how comprehensive the IS security policies
and guidelines should be, and the ways in which exceptional situations are addressed.
The case of a Finnish scuba-diving site that helped Finnish victims and relatives after the
North Sumatra tsunami in December 2004 (Nieminen, undated) illustrates the
significance of the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories in an
exceptional situation. Mr. Alex Nieminen, one of the administrators of the diving site,
started to receive short messages from Finnish divers in Thailand soon after the
catastrophe on December 26, 2004. As he received the messages pertaining to Finns
who had been found alive in hotels and hospitals, Mr. Nieminen inserted their names on
the website, www.sukellus.fi, providing information about survivors much earlier than the
official Finnish authorities did.
However, what Mr. Nieminen did was illegal. According to Finnish law, it is illegal to post
lists of names without the consent of the person in question. In fact, Nieminen was
contacted on December 30 by Mr. Reijo Aarnio, the national ombudsman of information
security in Finland. However, the Finnish government and the national ombudsman
decided to ignore the information security law in this exceptional situation.
This example demonstrates the limitations of the conservative deontological design
theory. First, practitioners need to be aware that compliance with IS security guidelines
for their own sake may get in the way of unexpected business (or other) opportunities
that require actions that conflict with the company’s IS security policy. Second, while it
attempts to cover all security issues in a security policy, the conservative deontological
design theory can easily lead to excessive security and unnecessary bureaucracy
(Madsen, 1995). Thus, we see that the conservative-deontological design theory is
impractical in organizations that have high environmental uncertainty (Boyd and Fulk,
1996 p. 4; Daft, et al., 1988 p. 125), because of its inflexible nature. The more turbulent
(having a fast rate of change), unpredictable and complex a business environment is,
the more inadequate the conservative-deontological design theory is. Furthermore, the
conservative-deontological design theory is postulated to be ineffective in organizations
with instrumentally-oriented (employees are expected to do everything to further the
company’s interest, regardless of the consequences), caring-oriented (employees are
expected to what is best for everyone), or independence-oriented (employees are
expected to follow their own beliefs) cultural norms, as observed in an empirical study by
Victor and Cullen (1998). On the other hand, the conservative-deontological design
theory is expected to be effective in rule-oriented organizations where people are used
to acting strictly by the book (Loch and Conger, 1996; Victor and Cullen, 1998).
The liberal-intuitive and virtue design theories are the two alternatives at the other
extreme. Their potential strengths result from the freedom they bestow on employees.
However, according to liberal intuitive thinking, this freedom would not have justified Mr.
Nieminen’s violation of the law in the case above, since liberal-intuitive design theory
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allows actions only in those situations that are not covered by policies or laws. In the
case of virtue design theory, actions in conflict with the IS security policies and
guidelines are not considered to be wrong, or punishable, as long as they can be
considered virtuous (just, honest and courageous). The action of Mr. Nieminen can be
considered courageous and therefore acceptable.
The freedom allowed by treat two design theories may also be a security threat. The
liberal-intuitive and virtue design theories rely on employees’ intuition either directly (in
the liberal-intuitive design theory) or through virtues (in the case of virtue ethics). These
may be poor guides in the case of IS security issues.
The prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories lie between the two
extreme positions. The strength of these three design theories, compared to the
conservative one, is their flexibility. They may lead to a better situation in terms of TCSA,
particularly in exceptional situations. Another strength, compared with the liberal-intuitive
and virtue design theories, relates to decision making and accountability in exceptional
situations. The prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories endeavor to
offer more reliable application principles by placing certain restrictions on the employees’
thinking through, for instance, the universality principle or utilitarian calculations. They all
emphasize that one should have good reasons to violate the IS security policies and
guidelines.
The possible weakness of the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design
theories relates to the rules governing exceptions (application principles): that is, the
factors that determine or justify the taking of an action that is in conflict with, or not
covered by, the IS security policies and guidelines. In this respect, the prima-facie
design theory stresses that the benefits of violating the guidelines must outweigh those
of complying with the guidelines. However, this condition has its problems. For example,
the sub-principle of the prima-facie design theory that states “the expected benefits of
compromising the security guidelines (excluding a person’s egoistic benefits) clearly
outweigh the expected benefits of complying with the guidelines” means that the
judgments devolve to the employees, and thus allow for subjective interpretations. For
instance, the view of what constitutes “benefits” may vary from person to person.
Similarly, the utilitarian application principles suggest choosing the course of action that
maximizes the happiness of the greatest number of people. But it is not easy to measure
others’ happiness (Siponen and Vartiainen, 2001); and does such maximization of
happiness necessarily lead to business success or security?
The universalizability design theory tries to overcome these weaknesses by enforcing
impartiality (the first principle) and the viewpoint of the security manager (the second
principle). But can employees ultimately know how the security manager or the president
of the organization would think? However, the strength of this design theory is that it
constrains employees to making decisions as if they were in the shoes of the security
manager or the president of the organization. In other words, even though no one can
know another’s thoughts, the employees are required to do their best to maintain
security from the security manager’s or the president’s point of view.
Despite all the difficulties discussed above, the actions of Mr. Nieminen can be justified
in terms of the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories. His action
responded to an enormous demand for information when the Finnish authorities were
unable to provide such information. On December 27 the website had 76,581 visitors,
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the next day 204,516 visitors, the following day 255,943 visitors, and on December
30,234,218 visitors, whereas the normal number of daily visitors was about 300. As a
consequence, one can argue that the expected benefits of his illegal action far exceeded
the expected benefits of complying with the law (prima-facie design theory). One can
also argue that his illegal action of publishing the names of survivors brought about great
happiness among people worried about their relatives and friends in the affected area in
Thailand at the time of the tsunami (utilitarian design theory). It also seems that the
national ombudsman of information security accepted Mr. Nieminen’s action in this
situation, suggesting that partial universalizability applied in this case.16

Research implications: A theoretical synthesis of the six design theories
The above example demonstrates that it is not always justifiable to stick literally to IS
security policies and guidelines. In an exceptional situation, one may have a good
reason to violate IS security policies and guidelines. The prima-facie, utilitarian, and
universalizability design theories provide general ideas on how to justify the violations.
One research problem is to produce empirical evidence as to how common various
categories of “exceptional” situations (where IS security policies and guidelines conflict
with business objectives) are in practice. A second research problem is to find out how
people address such conflicting situations: whether they just follow the rules, or violate
them in some way. If they violate the rules, a third research question is how do they
rationalize their actions, referring to net benefits, virtuousness, happiness, or perhaps
the universalizability of their actions? A fourth research question concerns the
consequences of complying with and violating IS security policies and guidelines: how
effective the different rationales suggested by the six design theories are in guiding
people’s actions.
Figure 3 presents a research model for the fourth research question. Its core is based on
the ten testable design product hypotheses derived from the six normative theories
(Tables 3-8, Figure 2). Referring to our discussion in section 5.1, we have also included
some external factors just to emphasize the fact that we do not claim that Hypotheses
H1-H10 tell the whole story. The purpose of the inclusion of the two external variables is
not to propose any contingency theory that there is a fit between the external factors and
the six design theories. The only purpose is to illustrate that the external factors may
influence the relationships assumed by Hypotheses H1-H10. The dotted arrows from
“Environmental turbulence” and “Organizational culture” depict the influence discussed
in Section 5.1 in the context of the conservative deontological design theory. They are
expected to moderate the effects as illustrated by the dotted lines.17 The solid arrows
from the two external variables remind one that these variables may also affect
relationships in Figure 3 more generally.

16

In this ‘tsunami’ case, we replaced the CEO/security manager with the national ombudsman.
Figure 3 makes a distinction between interaction effects (shown as joining lines) and
moderators (shown as arrows heading towards other arrows). The variables in the interaction
effect have a symmetrical role as predictors, and there may be more than two predictor variables
in the interaction term, whereas the variables in the moderator case are not symmetrical, and the
moderator moderates an association between one predictor variable and one dependent variable.

17
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Figure 3. A Theoretical Synthesis of the Six Design Theories
Figure 3 focuses on the factors that explain the “success” of IS security policies and
guidelines at the organizational level, the success being interpreted in terms of the Total
Cost of Security Actions (TCSA). The +/- signs after the hypotheses describe whether
the hypothesized relationship is assumed to increase or decrease the dependent
variable. The +/-signs next to the independent variables on the left describe whether the
influence of the dependent variable is an interactive relationship. For example, in the
case of H7, the more voluntary and the higher the expected benefits, the lower the
TCSA in exceptional situations.
As mentioned, the unit of analysis in Figure 3 is the organization. IS security policies and
guidelines are, however, followed by individual employees. The individual
adoption/acceptance of IS security policies and guidelines as a whole is another
research topic, in which the different models of individual acceptance of IT artifacts, such
as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and its extension to cover
moral behavior (Loch and Conger, 1996 p. 75-76), the Theory of Planned Behavior
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(Ajzen, 1991), the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989), and the Theory of
Intrinsic Motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985), can be utilized. 18 Since these are widely
applied in IS, we will not discuss them here. Our only comment here is that the
differences between the normative theories may also have implications for overall
acceptance. For example, while seeking to cover all situations comprehensively, the
conservative-deontological design theory easily results in a massive document of
policies and guidelines that becomes complex and difficult to use. The other design
theories (liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, utilitarian, universalizability) can be formulated in a
more condensed way and, therefore, may be easier to use. On the other hand, some
people may expect clear and definite policies and guidelines as exemplified by the
conservative-deontological design theory, and may find the alternative design theories
difficult to interpret and use.

Preliminary Ideas of Measuring the Constructs
The empirical testing of the model proposed in Figure 3 requires operationalization of the
concepts, which for some may be tricky, though not necessarily impossible. While it is
beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss these measurement issues at length,
we will outline preliminary ideas as to how the constructs identified in the model can be
measured.
Let us start with the easier constructs first. Organizational turbulence has been of
considerable research interest in organizational contingency theory since the 1960s,
leading to a number of measures (see Karimi et al., 2004, for a recent one). Although
research into organizational culture has mostly been qualitative/idiographic, there have
been some quantitative “measures” of it, too (e.g., Denison and Spreitzer, 1991;
Hofstede, et al., 1990). In the case of voluntariness, we refer to Moore and Benbasat
(1991) for a measurement instrument.
In the case of the comprehensiveness of IS security policies and guidelines, one can
conceive of two methods of measurement. One option is to discover respondents’
perceptions (preferably those of IS security experts) of this comprehensiveness using a
number of items, for example, to what extent they agree with statements likes “The
totality of IS security policies and guidelines in my organization is comprehensive” and
“Nothing essential is missing from the totality of IS security policies and guidelines in my
organization.” The second option is to list all the potential IS security issues to be
covered (perhaps based on an IS security checklist or set of standards, such as
BS7799-1, 2000; GAISP, 2003; ISF, 2003; Wood, et al., 1987), and to ask, in the case of
each issue, whether the organization’s IS security policy and guidelines cover these
issues.
The necessity of IS security policies and guidelines can easily be measured using
perceptual measures such as to what extent the respondent agrees with the statements,
“IS security policy and guidelines are absolutely necessary in my organization” and “IS
security policy and guidelines are absolutely critical in my organization.”

18

Note that focus in Figure 3 is on individual decisions whether to follow IS security policies and
guidelines rather than on the adoption/acceptance of the IS security policy as a whole. In fact,
Figure 3 presumes this adoption/acceptance, but it does not require that an employee follows IS
security policies and guidelines in all situations.
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Let us proceed now to the more tricky constructs in Figure 3. One problem is that it may
be difficult for the respondents to associate the philosophical concepts with actual
practice. Therefore, in moral psychology, it is not unusual to tie up the questions with
concrete problems through an imagined case – the moral dilemmas used by Kohlberg in
his Theory of Cognitive Moral Development (Kohlberg, 1981) being a well-known
example. Accordingly, one or more cases, such as the one presented in section 3.3.,
can be used to associate respondents’ answers with concrete problems. As an
illustration, we offer the following case (modified from the real case presented in section
3.3).19
Jack works in a software house, which has strict security rules laid down by a senior
security specialist, who is regarded as the authority figure in security matters. The
security policy includes a rule that states that passwords are personal and that one’s
password cannot be given to anybody else. Any exception must be approved by the
senior security specialist. During the summer, while the senior security specialist and
most of the developers are on their holidays, Jack and a few of his co-workers receive
additional requirements for feature changes from an important customer. Jack needs to
make changes to the software quickly in order to keep to the deadline. To do this, Jack
needs to access some files to which he currently does not have access (access can be
granted by a developer, who is on his holiday at that time, and the security specialist or
his subordinates). Jack cannot reach the senior security specialist at that time, and the
developer who has control over the files is also on holiday. He is available, but cannot
remember his password any more (he forgot it while on holiday). Jack contacts Matt,
who is a subordinate of the senior security specialist, but Matt wonders if he dares to
violate the IS security policy of the organization. If Matt does not grant access to Jack,
the result is that the software company will miss the deadline, which further results in the
software company having to compensate the client financially. This may further damage
the reputation of the software company, which in turn may reduce future contracts, and
lead to other consequences.
After having read the example, the respondents can be asked to answer a number of
questions, imagining that they are confronted with this problem in real life, in Matt’s
position. The questions might include, for example, to what extent he or she agrees with
statements such as “If I were absolutely sure that the benefits of violating the IS security
policy and guidelines in the example situation would exceed the costs, I would be ready
to violate the policy and guidelines” and “If I knew that the benefits of the violation would
far exceed the costs, I would be ready to violate the policy and guidelines.”
The example above may best illustrate expected benefits and costs (prima-facie design
theory). One could imagine analogous examples that might identify the virtuousness,
happiness, and universalizability of actions. In each case, one could present similar
questions: “If I knew that violation of IS security policy and guidelines in the example
situation represented just and honest action, I would be ready to violate the policy and
guidelines,” “If I knew that violation of IS security policy and guidelines in the example
situation would bring happiness to the people affected (such as employees, customers,
and stakeholders of the organization), I would be ready to violate the policy and
guidelines,” and “If I knew that the CEO of the organization would accept the violation of
the security policy in the example situation, it would encourage me to violate the policy.”
19

Of course, it would be better if the imagined case could be rooted in each respondent’s own
organization.
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Summary
Existing studies on IS security policies pay little attention to how to deal with exceptional
situations in which IS security policies are in conflict with the business objectives of
organizations. To fill this gap, this paper first develops an IS security design theory
framework, and then proposes six kernel theories with distinctive application principles
by which such conflicts can be resolved. These six kernel theories are: the conservativedeontological, liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, virtue, utilitarian, and universalizability
normative theories. Based on these, we derived six normative design theories for IS
security policies and guidelines. The conservative-deontological design theory was
argued to be suitable only in stable business environments and in rule-oriented
organizations (where people are accustomed to acting by the book). Outside of ruleoriented organizations, and in a turbulent business environment, it is advisable to adopt
the prima-facie, the virtue, the utilitarian, or the universalizability design theory. These
six design theories were synthesized into a theoretical model. Once tested empirically,
the results will lead to new insights on the extent to which IS security policies and
guidelines should be backed by expected net benefits, virtuous actions, happiness, and
unversalizability. This will help organizations to design effective IS security policies and
guidelines in practice.
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